My article on preference falsification on surveys is now out in @PSRMJournal. Nonresponse rates are often used as a proxy for the sensitivity bias associated with PF. This article casts doubt on the utility of such measures. dictatorsky, polisky www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
New publication at Nations and Nationalism [open access]: "Social costs and policy preferences: Evidence from territorial strategies in Catalonia" onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
نظر من در مورد اوضاع واحوال در کویت - برای ایرانیان سیاست، دموکراسی و آزادی بیان در کویت - در گفتوگو با فرناز سیفی t.co/hiW1jhqKy0
Questions, comments, feedback always welcome. We plan to do a lot more with this data and are eager to see others use it in their research. 8/
On the other hand, the latter evokes a political environment that functions in a manner closer to a stylized version of democratic polities: ideological groups attract votes, succeed to office, and are granted policy influence commensurate with their popular support. 7/
The normative implications of these mechanisms differ. The former mechanism suggests resource wealth allows leaders to buy off the political elite within the legislative arena. 6/
And we find evidence of both mechanisms at work. A standard deviation increase in oil revenues is associated with a 2 percentage point increase in voting with the regime. Ministerial appointments have a similarly strong effect. 5/
We leverage exogenous shocks to the price of oil (rents) and cabinet appointments (concessions) to assess the efficacy of these strategies. Because the Council of Ministers (cabinet) votes on each law, we have unusually precise insight into the regime's preferences. 4/
Canonical work in the authoritarian politics literature identifies economic rents and policy concessions as critically important. Both, it is assumed, are used by incumbent autocrats to induce conformity to the regime's policy agenda. 3/