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On Sequential Functions and Fine-Grained Cryptography (Jiaxin Guan, Hart Montgomery) ia.cr/2024/1050

Abstract. A sequential function is, informally speaking, a function f for which a massively parallel adversary cannot compute “substantially” faster than an honest user with limited parallel computation power. Sequential functions form the backbone of many primitives that are extensively used in blockchains such as verifiable delay functions (VDFs) and time-lock puzzles. Despite this widespread practical use, there has been little work studying the complexity or theory of sequential functions. Our main result is a black-box oracle separation between sequential functions and one-way functions: in particular, we show the existence of an oracle 𝒪 that implies a sequential function but not a one-way function. This seems surprising since sequential functions are typically constructed from very strong assumptions that imply one-way functions and also since time-lock puzzles are known to imply one-way functions (Bitansky et al., ITCS ’16). We continue our exploration of the theory of sequential functions. We show that, informally speaking, the decisional, worst-case variant of a certain class of sequential function called a continuous iterative sequential function (CISF) is PSPACE-complete. A CISF is, in a nutshell, a sequential function f that can be written in the form f(k,x) = g^(k)(x) for some function g where k is an input determining the number of “rounds” the function is evaluated. We then show that more general forms of sequential functions are not contained in PSPACE relative to a random oracle. Given these results, we then ask if it is possible to build any interesting cryptographic primitives from sequential functions that are not one-way. It turns out that even if we assume just the existence of a CISF that is not one-way, we can build certain “fine-grained” cryptographic primitives where security is defined similarly to traditional primitives with the exception that it is only guaranteed for some (generally polynomial) amount of time. In particular, we show how to build “fine-grained” symmetric key encryption and “fine-grained” MACs from a CISF. We also show how to build fine-grained public-key encryption from a VDF with a few extra natural properties and indistinguishability obfucsation (iO) for null circuits. We do not assume one-way functions. Finally, we define a primitive that we call a commutative sequential function - essentially a sequential function that can be computed in sequence to get the same output in two different ways - and show that it implies fine-grained key exchange.
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Unofficial bot tracking updates to the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (eprint.iacr.org/). Maintained by @str4d.xyz. Currently only posts about new papers. Author names are linkified to Bluesky accounts; contact maintainer for inclusion or removal.
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