Sorry—just read this! I’m looking forward to reading your article and love to hear more about your new project!

Logical form bears the same kind of relationship to consequence that degrees celsius does to temperature. It is a system of measurement not a property of the thing measured.

Heidegger seems to argue that humans are superior to animals in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and that biology is incapable of investigating life. I’m trying to argue that his lecture course does not need to be read in such an anthropocentric and hopeless way.

Sometimes love is objectifying. This is a bad kind of love, but it is genuine; and it takes a whole book exploring the metaphysics of love, beauty, and objectification to explain how this can be so. Along the way, there’s a lot to say about the self, oppressive beauty norms, and self-annihilation.

I'd love to hear more about that, Elena! (I agree re: trust in science and non-epistemic values. I discuss that (albeit all too briefly) in this paper philpapers.org/rec/CONITA-5 and a whole chapter of my book will be on that, but I don't have any references relating trust in science & justice)

Despite existing work on the value-ladenness of science, the connection between choices of specific non-epistemic values and trust in science has received less attention. Starting from accounts of trust involving acting in accordance to justice, I explore implications for choices in public health.

Practically all of the messiness, imprecision, speculative inference, volatile trust, partial success and informative failure involved in the conduct of actual communication is epistemically relevant to the epistemology of testimony.

The core pedagogy behind Philosophy as a Way of Life can be generalized across the curriculum. This is good because it centers all of higher education on human flourishing, which is kind of the point.

Hume is an idealist in the _Treatise_ and thinks the impression of efficacy is efficacy. This leads him into paradox. He moves away from idealism in later writings and distinguishes between laws and causes. He is a regularity theorist about causes and an attenuated deist about the source of laws.

Utilitarianism can be a radically progressive moral theory, compatible with a kind of Marxism, once the importance of social connection is recognised to both moral patiency and agency