Amid all the discussion of how good, useful, dangerous or impactful LLMs will be, the degree to which they're vulnerable to malicious hacking and other security fails seems to be getting short shrift.
I always point out, that it is not simply a descriptive term, but has a strong prescriptive element. It shapes expectations, about what is possible and not possible politically.
Only from the history books, one of my first memories is watching this on the news: youtu.be/t6zKEUGsPCo?...
YouTube video by PeaceLink
Will do :)
The reason is, that these sometimes quite controversial debates about these concepts are often overshadowed by the large Euromissile/anti-nuclear debate of the 1980s. And I think, we can still learn a lot from these past debates.
Thank you! :) I am currently focusing a lot on the debate of the 1970s and 1980s about conventional deterrence/defense in NATO, and especially the European side of it. So Active Defense, AirLand Battle, FOFA, that stuff - but also the conventional alternative "defensive defense" concepts.
Thanks, James! Working on some papers already!
Some personal news: I have joined the @ifshhamburg.bsky.social arms control team as a researcher, after working there since Nov 2022 as a research assistant. I will focus on the intersection of arms control and military strategy and in particular try to bring in my background as a historian.
Der Begriff ist schlichtweg eine intellektuelle Bankrotterklärung all jener, die ihn ernsthaft verwenden.
Some extemporaneous thoughts on the potential impact of Nasrallah's death. In the long-term 5-10 year timeframe, it will likely have little decisive impact. In the mid-term 5-10 month period, it's significant, but Hezbollah is a highly entrenched and resilient institution. 🧵