Last but not least... I am on the job market since last summer and it hasn't been exactly a lucky ride. 😟 If anyone knows of positions for academics with an aptitude for interdisciplinary and evoutionarily grounded approaches to social cognition, do let me know! 🐒♥️ (15/15)Last but not least... I am on the job market since last summer and it hasn't been exactly a lucky ride. 😟 If anyone knows of positions for academics with an aptitude for interdisciplinary and evoutionarily grounded approaches to social cognition, do let me know! 🐒♥️ (15/15)

There's much more to be said here, but it's time to wrap it up. Huge thanks to the editor and reviewers, as well as to my collaborators Jun Yin and Mikolaj Hernik for having helped along the way. 💪🧠 (14/15)There's much more to be said here, but it's time to wrap it up. Huge thanks to the editor and reviewers, as well as to my collaborators Jun Yin and Mikolaj Hernik for having helped along the way. 💪🧠 (14/15)

I don't know about you, but I find this possibility — that episodic events may be encoded (and recalled) differently based on assumptions about the relational history they are part of — absolutely fascinating (and deeply counterintuitive). (13/15)I don't know about you, but I find this possibility — that episodic events may be encoded (and recalled) differently based on assumptions about the relational history they are part of — absolutely fascinating (and deeply counterintuitive). (13/15)

But, most importantly (and daringly), it suggests that infants may encode elements of an observed interaction based on relational priors: i.e., probabilistic guesses about the coordination rule they assume the agents to be modelling their long-term rapport onto. (12/15)But, most importantly (and daringly), it suggests that infants may encode elements of an observed interaction based on relational priors: i.e., probabilistic guesses about the coordination rule they assume the agents to be modelling their long-term rapport onto. (12/15)

Why does this matter? To begin with, this evidence adds an additional relational concept to the growing "grammar of social relations" developmental scientists have discovered in recent years (from dominance to kin-like relationships). (11/15)Why does this matter? To begin with, this evidence adds an additional relational concept to the growing "grammar of social relations" developmental scientists have discovered in recent years (from dominance to kin-like relationships). (11/15)

The idea that infants may infer a relationship whose stability depends on balanced exchange helps explaining why the representation of giving not only marks the coalitional boundaries of the relationship (who is with whom?), but also changes of resource flow within it. (10/15)The idea that infants may infer a relationship whose stability depends on balanced exchange helps explaining why the representation of giving not only marks the coalitional boundaries of the relationship (who is with whom?), but also changes of resource flow within it. (10/15)

Why do they do that? The answer, I argue, is in the type of relationship that infants assume giving to be an instance of: equality matching — a relationship based on the long-term equalising of social investments between the parties involved. (9/15)Why do they do that? The answer, I argue, is in the type of relationship that infants assume giving to be an instance of: equality matching — a relationship based on the long-term equalising of social investments between the parties involved. (9/15)

For instance, infants encode the identity of an object (what is transferred?) and the direction of transfer (from and to whom?) only in giving, but not taking, events. This information effectively furnishes the representation with bookkeeping tags. (8/15)For instance, infants encode the identity of an object (what is transferred?) and the direction of transfer (from and to whom?) only in giving, but not taking, events. This information effectively furnishes the representation with bookkeeping tags. (8/15)

Secondly, even when we induce infants to represent giving and taking in the same interactional way (by prodiving them with additional cues of the patients' affectedness), other differences pop out. (7/15)Secondly, even when we induce infants to represent giving and taking in the same interactional way (by prodiving them with additional cues of the patients' affectedness), other differences pop out. (7/15)

To exemplify: patients are necessary for the costs of a giving actions to be rationalised, whereas they are not in case of taking (which can be understood as directed to the goal of resource acquisition, regardless of its effects of the object's original possessor). (6/15)To exemplify: patients are necessary for the costs of a giving actions to be rationalised, whereas they are not in case of taking (which can be understood as directed to the goal of resource acquisition, regardless of its effects of the object's original possessor). (6/15)