haha... er det dig der har lavet det billede?

Kan findes her: www.martinvlarsen.com/s/Housing_Po...

In terms of the US debate, we can of course not be sure that our results travel. In fact, there might be good reasons for why they do not. However, the results should invite more nuanced reflections on whether local control can be harnessed as a force for more housebuilding. polisky

These results challenge the CW on whether local control drive the housing affordability crisis. At a minimum, our results have two implications. 1. Local control can *sometimes* lead to more housing. 2. Local control leads to more housing in DK by shaping city interest.

In line with this, we find that the effect is concentrated: *among jurisdictions which became physically much larger (area) *where tax base volatility was reduced *on permits where there is a large fiscal upside

We think this is because small local gov'ts are more inclined to use housebuilding to attract new taxpayers. For small muni's, it is easier to attract new tax payers (they are closer), and their tax base is more susceptible to negative shocks (e.g., on local employment).

But we find no sign of this! The municipalities that increased in jurisdiction size started to permit *much less market rate housing* after the reform, relative to the municipalities that did not increase in size. So why did less local control lead to fewer permits???

The reform in question markedly increased the jurisdiction size of some, but not all, local governments in Denmark. In the new, larger municipalities, we might have expected the political power of NIMBY homeowners to decline relative to the median voter or the growth machine.