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Antonino Polizzi
@polizzan.bsky.social
PhD student at the University of Oxford. Demographer. Researching drivers and consequences of working-age mortality. He/him. Photo by Potters Instinct Photography.
125 followers141 following7 posts
APpolizzan.bsky.social

You can also read Abrams et al.’s response here: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2320028121 Let's keep the conversation going! 🗨️ #mortality #demography #lifeexpectancy

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APpolizzan.bsky.social

Different counterfactuals provide different perspectives, neither is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. What do you think is the best way to analyze US life expectancy stagnation? Read our letter: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2318276121@leverhulme.bsky.social@popassocamerica.bsky.social@eapsphd.bsky.social (6)

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APpolizzan.bsky.social

BOTTOM LINE: Working-age mortality is still an important driver of US life expectancy stagnation globally, but as Abrams et al. rightfully point out, we need to explore older-age slowdowns too. 📉 (5)BOTTOM LINE: Working-age mortality is still an important driver of US life expectancy stagnation globally, but as Abrams et al. rightfully point out, we need to explore older-age slowdowns too. 📉 (5)

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APpolizzan.bsky.social

We calculate an alternative counterfactual: What would US life expectancy be if 2010-19 age-specific mortality improved like in other high-income countries? 🌍 We find the opposite pattern: 25-64 mortality is more important than 65+ for explaining counterfactual differences. (4) We calculate an alternative counterfactual: What would US life expectancy be if 2010-19 age-specific mortality improved like in other high-income countries? 🌍 We find the opposite pattern: 25-64 mortality is more important than 65+ for explaining counterfactual differences. (4)

Figure 2 from Polizzi/Dowd (2024), showing counterfactual US life expectancy values for females and males in 2010-2019. USA panel replicates Figure 1 from Abrams et al. (2023).
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APpolizzan.bsky.social

We question whether this within-US counterfactual tells the whole story for 2 reasons: - 25-64 US mortality was already stagnating in 2000-09, so less room to get worse. - 2010-19 slowdowns in 65+ mortality improvements were common globally, but rising 25-64 mortality wasn’t. (3)We question whether this within-US counterfactual tells the whole story for 2 reasons: - 25-64 US mortality was already stagnating in 2000-09, so less room to get worse. - 2010-19 slowdowns in 65+ mortality improvements were common globally, but rising 25-64 mortality wasn’t. (3)

Figure 1 from Polizzi/Dowd (2024), showing rates of mortality improvement in 2000-2009 and 2010-2019 for females and males in five high-income countries.
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APpolizzan.bsky.social

Abrams et al. calculated counterfactual US life expectancy in 2010-19 if annual age-specific mortality changes followed 2000-09 trends. Surprise finding: Slowdowns in 65+ mortality improvements explain more post-2010 stagnation than 25-64 mortality. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2308360120 (2)

Figure 1 from Abrams et al. (2023), showing counterfactual US life expectancy values for women and men in 2010-2019.
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AP
Antonino Polizzi
@polizzan.bsky.social
PhD student at the University of Oxford. Demographer. Researching drivers and consequences of working-age mortality. He/him. Photo by Potters Instinct Photography.
125 followers141 following7 posts